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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys significant developments in intellectual property
(IP) law during the past year (i.e., 2017 or the Survey period).1 This arti-
cle reviews IP law developments that are likely to be influential in the
evolution of Texas IP jurisprudence. Thus, the cases cited focus on the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. For developments in trademark and copyright law,
although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s authority is
binding, other circuits are considered highly persuasive.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided several cases involving IP issues dur-
ing this Survey period. In patents, the Supreme Court considered the ap-
plicability of the laches defense to infringement actions, and the patent
exhaustion doctrine with respect to both domestic and international
sales.2 In both of these cases, the Supreme Court took steps towards har-
1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors and are
not necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
2. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954
(2017); Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
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monizing patent law and copyright law.3 The Supreme Court also ad-
dressed the first prong of the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).4
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also weighed in on
patent venue and set forth the requirements for the second prong of
§ 1400(b).5 As for administrative proceedings, the Federal Circuit ad-
dressed limits on the authority of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) with respect to statutory interpretation.6
In trademark, the Supreme Court considered whether the disparage-
ment clause of the Lanham Act is facially unconstitutional under the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Meanwhile, in copyright, the Su-
preme Court defined the proper test for separability.7 The Federal Circuit
also made important developments to copyright jurisprudence by consid-
ering whether online-marketing activity could create seller liability under
various provisions of the Federal Copyright Act.8
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
1. No Need to Rush, Take Your Time, You Have 6 Years!—SCA
Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby
Products, LLC
Laches—an equitable defense that bars recovery in suits filed after un-
reasonable delays—is a well-established doctrine.9 The period of recov-
ery provided by 35 U.S.C. § 286 prevents a claim for damages where the
patent infringement occurred more than six years before the filing of the
claim.10 In SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prod-
ucts, LLC, the Supreme Court addressed the intersection between laches
and claims for damages in patent infringement actions brought within the
allowed period dictated by § 286.11 The Supreme Court held that
“[l]aches cannot be interposed as a defense against damages where the
infringement occurred within the [six-year] period prescribed by § 286.”12
To arrive at its decision, the Supreme Court followed the reasoning it set
forth in a related copyright case, Petrella v. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer,
3. See SCA, 137 S. Ct. at 961 (following the reasoning set forth in a related copyright
case, Petrella v. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014)); Impression, 137 S.
Ct. at 1527 (applying patent exhaustion to foreign sales in a manner parallel to the ap-
proach used when applying copyright’s first sales doctrine to foreign sales).
4. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
5. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
6. Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
7. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
8. Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 693 F. App’x 879 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (not
selected for publication), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 335 (2017).
9. See Laches, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 286.
11. See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct.
954, 959 (2017).
12. Id. at 967.
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Inc.,13 in which the Supreme Court held that laches is not available as a
defense against damages incurred within the allowed period prescribed
by the Copyright Act.14 With its decision in SCA, the Supreme Court
took another step towards harmonizing patent law with other types of law
and, specifically, copyright law.
After SCA sent a notice to First Quality in 2003 alleging infringement
of SCA’s patent, First Quality responded that it had a prior art patent
that invalidated SCA’s patent.15 SCA then initiated a reexamination pro-
ceeding to determine the validity of SCA’s patent in light of First Qual-
ity’s earlier patent.16 About three years after receiving a certificate from
the PTO confirming the validity of its patent, SCA filed a patent infringe-
ment action against First Quality.17 The U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Kentucky granted First Quality summary judgment based
on laches and equitable estoppel.18
On appeal, a Federal Circuit panel reversed the district court’s decision
on equitable estoppel, but held that laches did indeed bar SCA’s claims
for damages based on the precedent set in A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.
Chaides Construction Co.19 Although the panel’s decision came after the
Supreme Court had already decided Petrella, the Federal Circuit reheard
the case en banc in light of Petrella. In a 6–5 en banc decision, the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed based on “Aukerman’s holding that laches can be used
to defeat a claim for damages within the [six]-year period” provided by
§ 286.20
In a majority opinion by Justice Alito, with only Justice Breyer dissent-
ing, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision in part and
remanded.21 Applying the logic of Petrella, the Supreme Court inferred
that Congress intended that a patent owner “may recover damages for
any infringement committed within six years of the filing of the claim,” as
set forth in § 286. The Supreme Court stated that Petrella confirmed the
general rule, well-established at the time of the 1952 Patent Act, that
laches cannot preclude a claim for damages incurred within an allowed
period set by Congress.22 The Supreme Court recognized that the Federal
Circuit’s position that 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) codified the defense of laches
and created an exception to § 286, and that First Quality’s argument that
laches is incorporated in § 282(b)(1) under the defense of “unenforceabil-
13. 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
14. SCA, 137 S. Ct. at 959 (citing Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 507(b) (“No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is





19. Id. at 959 n.1; see also A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d
1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc), abrogated by SCA, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017).
20. SCA, 137 S. Ct. at 959.
21. Id. at 967.
22. Id. at 963.
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ity” relied heavily on pre-1952 patent cases.23 The Supreme Court ex-
plained, however, that “nothing less than a broad and unambiguous
consensus of lower court decisions could support the inference that
§ 282(b)(1) codifies a very different patent-law-specific rule.”24 After sur-
veying the pre-1952 case law relied upon by First Quality and the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court found no such broad and unambiguous
consensus.25
Notably, in a sharply worded dissent, Justice Breyer provided his own
evaluation of the pre-1952 case law and pointed out that the majority
could not point to one case holding that the equitable defense of laches
“could not bar” a claim for damages.26 Justice Alito, however, suggested
that the dissent did not appreciate that First Quality, and not the Su-
preme Court, bore the burden of showing that Congress intended to devi-
ate from the general rule.27
The Supreme Court’s decision in SCA is clear that laches is unavailable
as a defense against damages for infringement that occurred within the
six-year period allowed by § 286.28 Further, its decision in SCA, which
relies heavily on the Petrella copyright case, continues the trend of the
Supreme Court attempting to bring patent law into harmony with other
areas of law and, specifically, other areas of IP law.
2. Location, Location, Location: Everyone Wants the Best Venue—TC
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC
After sixty years of silence since its decision in Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Products Corp.,29 the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
venue for patent infringement actions in one of the most highly antici-
pated cases of 2017—TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands
LLC.30 The patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), sets forth a two-
prong approach to determining proper venue in a patent infringement
case.31 In TC Heartland, the Supreme Court addressed the first prong of
§ 1400(b), which provides that venue is proper “where the defendant
resides.”32
23. Id.
24. Id. at 964.
25. Id.; see also id. at 964–66 (evaluating pre-1952 case law falling into three groups:
(1) pre-1938 cases in equity courts; (2) pre-1938 cases in law courts; and (3) cases decided
after the 1938 merger of equity and law).
26. Id. at 972 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at 968–71 (evaluating the pre-1952 case
law).
27. See id. at 966, 966 n.8 (majority opinion).
28. Id. at 967.
29. 353 U.S. 222 (1957) (holding that the word “reside[nce]” in § 1400(b) as applied to
domestic corporations refers only to the state of incorporation).
30. 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in
the judicial district [(1)] where the defendant resides, or [(2)] where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”).
32. Id.
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Issues surrounding venue in patent infringement actions have been
brewing ever since the Federal Circuit’s 1990 decision in VE Holding
Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.33 In VE Holding, the Federal Circuit
held that Congress’ 1988 amendment of the general venue statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1391, which broadened the scope of the term “resides,” also
modified the meaning of the same term in § 1400(b).34 The Supreme
Court’s decision in TC Heartland, however, overturned VE Holding, with
the Supreme Court holding that under § 1400(b), “a domestic corpora-
tion ‘resides’ only in its [s]tate of incorporation.”35 The Supreme Court
concluded that Congress’ amendments to § 1391 regarding “resides” did
not affect the interpretation of “resides” in § 1400(b).36 The Court also
reiterated that § 1400(b) is the exclusive authority for venue in patent
infringement actions, as it had previously determined in Fourco.37
TC Heartland is a company “organized under Indiana law and head-
quartered in Indiana,” while Kraft Foods is “organized under Delaware
law [but] has its principal place of business in Illinois.”38 Kraft Foods sued
TC Heartland in the District Court for the District of Delaware, but TC
Heartland moved to dismiss the case or transfer venue to Indiana based
on improper venue.39 The district court rejected TC Heartland’s motion,
and the Federal Circuit denied TC Heartland’s petition for a writ of man-
damus, using the meaning of “reside” under the general venue statute
§ 1391 to interpret “reside” under the patent venue statute § 1400(b).40
The Supreme Court, relying heavily on the legislative history involved
in the amendments to § 1391 over time and the express savings clause in
§ 1391, held that “reside[nce]” in § 1400(b), for domestic corporations,
means the state of incorporation.41 The Supreme Court further deter-
mined that Congress did not intend to modify the meaning of “reside” in
§ 1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco.42 Although § 1391(c) indicates that
the rule applies for “all” venue purposes, the Supreme Court noted that
the savings clause in § 1391(a) “stating that it does not apply when ‘other-
wise provided by law’ . . . contemplates that certain venue statutes may
retain definitions of ‘resides’ that conflict with its default definition.”43
The Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland definitively defines the
residency requirement of the first prong of § 1400(b) for domestic corpo-
rations, but leaves other questions unanswered.44 For example, the Su-
33. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), abrogated by TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
34. Id. at 1584.
35. TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 1519.
38. Id. at 1517.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1517–18.
41. Id. at 1521; see also id. at 1518–21 (analyzing the legislative history associated with
Congress’ amendments to § 1391).
42. See id. at 1520–21.
43. Id. at 1521.
44. Id.
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preme Court did not address venue with respect to foreign corporations
or unincorporated business entities.45 Further, the Supreme Court did not
address the second prong of § 1400(b), which provides that venue is
proper “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has
a regular and established place of business.”46
While it is probably too soon to tell just how impactful the TC Heart-
land decision will be, the decision appears to have already had an effect
on the jurisdictional makeup of infringement action filings. In 2017, dis-
trict courts in Delaware, California, and New York saw an increase in
filings post-TC Heartland.
3. One and Done—Impression Products Inc. v. Lexmark
International, Inc.
The Supreme Court revisited the patent exhaustion doctrine in Impres-
sion Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. and held that when a
patent owner sells a product, that sale exhausts all patent rights regard-
less of any limitations on the sale imposed by the patent owner and re-
gardless of the location of the sale.47 The Supreme Court’s decision
means that both domestic sales and international sales will exhaust patent
rights.48
Lexmark manufactures and sells toner cartridges for laser printers.49
Other companies, such as Impression, buy empty toner cartridges from
consumers, refill these toner cartridges with toner, and then resell the
toner cartridges at a discounted price.50 Lexmark, aware of the practices
of these other companies, offers two options to consumers: (1) purchase
the toner cartridge at full price without any restrictions; or (2) purchase
the toner cartridge at a discounted price in exchange for agreeing to use
the toner cartridge only once and returning it to Lexmark for remanufac-
turing and recycling.51 Although Lexmark installed a microchip on each
toner cartridge to help enforce these restrictions on sales, the other com-
panies became more creative and found ways to circumvent the
microchip.52 Lexmark sued for patent infringement.53
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted Im-
pression’s motion to dismiss with respect to the toner cartridges sold in
the United States, but denied its motion with respect to the toner car-
45. See id. at 1517–20 nn.1–2.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b); but see In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that a “regular and established place of business” must be a physical place).
47. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017).
48. See id.
49. Id. at 1529.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1529–30; see also Lexmark Return Cartridges, LEXMARK, https://www
.lexmark.com/en_us/products/supplies-and-accessories/lexmark-return-cartridges.html
[https://perma.cc/WB5U-FUXZ].
52. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1530.
53. Id.
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tridges sold abroad.54 After both parties appealed, the Federal Circuit
considered the appeals en banc and found in favor of Lexmark, holding
that patent owners can preserve their patent rights after both domestic
and abroad sales if they impose restrictions on post-sale activities.55
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
reversed.56
First addressing the issue of patent exhaustion with respect to domestic
sales, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Federal Circuit reached a
different result largely because it got off on the wrong foot.”57 The Su-
preme Court explained that the Federal Circuit’s error was in interpreting
the patent exhaustion doctrine as a presumption about the particular
rights that accompany a sale.58 The Supreme Court clarified that the pat-
ent exhaustion doctrine actually limits the scope of a patent owner’s
rights.59 The Supreme Court went on to state that the Federal Circuit’s
concern regarding creating an artificial distinction between a sale of a
product and a sale by license is misplaced.60 The patent exhaustion doc-
trine is rooted in concerns against restraints on the alienability of a prod-
uct after sale.61 Accordingly, a patent owner’s ability to place restrictions
on licensees does not translate to the patent owner being able to “impose
post-sale restrictions on purchasers that are enforceable through the pat-
ent laws” because the sale of a license does not pose the same concerns
regarding alienation.62
In addressing the second issue of patent exhaustion with respect to
sales abroad, the Supreme Court likened the patent exhaustion doctrine
to the copyright first sale doctrine, noting that it would make little sense
to differentiate between the two.63 The Supreme Court relied on the rea-
soning of yet another copyright case, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.,64 noting that both Kirtsaeng and Impression shared a “strong simi-
larity . . . and identity of purpose.”65 In Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court
held that the first sale doctrine applies to copyrighted works sold
abroad.66 In Impression, relying at least in part on its decision in Kirt-
saeng, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that a sale abroad ex-
hausts a patent owner’s patent rights.67 Of note, the government,
participating as an amicus party, argued that a compromise where “a for-
eign sale authorized by the U.S. patentee exhausts U.S. patent rights un-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1531.
57. Id. at 1533.
58. Id. at 1534.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1527.
62. Id. at 1534–35.
63. Id. at 1536.
64. 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
65. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1536 (citation omitted).
66. Id. (citing Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 525).
67. See id.
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less those rights are expressly reserved.”68 The Supreme Court, however,
rejected the government’s arguments, finding the “compromise” to be
simply public policy and not principle.69
Justice Ginsburg concurred in part with respect to the holding on do-
mestic sales, but dissented with respect to the holding on international
sales.70 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that a sale abroad “operates indepen-
dently of the U.S. patent system,” and therefore cannot exhaust the U.S.
patent rights of a patent owner.71 Justice Ginsburg further noted that the
protections provided by a U.S. patent do not extend beyond the United
States, emphasizing that a competitor who sells a U.S.-patented product
abroad faces no consequences.72 Although just how profound its impact
will be remains to be seen, in a global economy that includes gray market
goods, watching how the Supreme Court’s decision in Impression will un-
fold may prove interesting.
4. Cases to Watch for in 2018: Oil States Energy Services, LLC v.
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC and SAS Institute Inc. v.
Matal
In 2018, the Supreme Court will likely reach decisions in Oil States En-
ergy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC73 and SAS Institute
Inc. v. Matal.74 In Oil States, the Supreme Court is confronted with the
question of the constitutionality of Inter Partes Reviews (IPRs). In SAS,
the Supreme Court is confronted with the question of whether the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) is required to provide a Final Written
Decision for every claim that a petitioner challenges in a petition for an
IPR. The Supreme Court has already heard oral arguments in both cases.
While the potential ramifications of the Supreme Court finding IPRs un-
constitutional in Oil States are significant, SAS is also highly anticipated,
as the Supreme Court’s decision will likely have a significant effect on the
strategy used by petitioners in IPRs. These two cases have the potential
to create an interesting juxtaposition of outcomes for practitioners.
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
1. Settling on the Admission of Settlement Agreements, an Exercise in
Balance—Prism Technologies LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P.
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Prism Technologies LLC v. Sprint
Spectrum L.P. provides guidance to district courts considering the proba-
tive value and prejudicial implications of allowing a patent owner to in-
68. Id. at 1537 (citing Brief for United States at 7–8, Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (No.
15-1189), 2017 WL 371923).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1538 (Ginsburg, J., dissent).
71. Id. at 1539.
72. Id. at 1538–39.
73. 639 F. App’x 639 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017).
74. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017).
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troduce a prior settlement agreement to support reasonable royalty
damage calculations.75 As explained in Sprint, the particulars of the litiga-
tion underlying the settlement agreement, and its similarities to the in-
stant action “matter” to the balancing courts, should do under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 (Rule 403) before admitting the prior settlement as
evidence.76
In April 2012, Prism filed separate suits against five wireless service
providers, including Sprint and AT&T Mobility (AT&T), alleging in-
fringement of its patents relating to a system for managing access to pro-
tected computer resources.77 While the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nebraska consolidated some of the pretrial proceedings, the
district court tried the cases separately.78 Although the AT&T case pro-
ceeded to trial, just prior to closing arguments Prism and AT&T settled
(AT&T Agreement) and the AT&T case was dismissed.79
In Sprint, Prism offered the AT&T Agreement as evidence of the
proper amount of reasonable royalty damages and argued that the proba-
tive value of the agreement outweighed any prejudice.80 Although Sprint
timely objected to the admission of the AT&T Agreement and argued
that its admission would be unfairly prejudicial, the district court agreed
with Prism and admitted the prior settlement.81 At the conclusion of trial,
the jury found Sprint liable for infringement and awarded Prism $30 mil-
lion in reasonable royalty damages.82 While the Federal Circuit consid-
ered a number of legal issues on appeal, its holding that the district court
did not err in admitting the AT&T Settlement Agreement under Rule
403 will likely be the primary reasoning cited for the opinion.83
The Federal Circuit began by recognizing that it has ruled in favor of
the admissibility of settlement agreements in patent suits under certain
circumstances, and that the district court has broad discretion under Rule
403.84 The Federal Circuit explained that when considering the admissi-
bility of a settlement agreement, the district court should consider and
balance the various reasons that a particular settlement may or may not
be probative in valuing the patented technology rather than applying a
per se rule.85 The Federal Circuit recognized that a prior settlement
agreement can be probative of the technology’s value because it “can re-
flect the assessment by interested and adversarial parties of the range of
75. Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
76. Id. at 1370.
77. Id. at 1365.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1368.
81. Id. at 1365–66.
82. Id. at 1366.
83. See id. at 1368 (holding that the district court’s denial of Sprint’s motion to exclude
was not an abuse of discretion).
84. Id. at 1368–69.
85. Id. at 1369.
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plausible litigation outcomes on that very issue of valuation.”86 The Fed-
eral Circuit also suggested that two kinds of settlement agreements might
be especially informative of a technology’s value—those covering the
same technology as the technology at issue in the instant action, and
those further along in the litigation process—after issues are explored
and tested.87
On the other hand, the Federal Circuit acknowledged there could be
various reasons why a prior settlement may not reflect the value of the
technology at issue.88 For example, the prior settlement value may be too
low if it involves a discount for litigation concerns, such as the probability
of losing on validity or infringement or the avoidance of unrecoverable
future litigation costs.89 Similarly, a prior settlement may be inflated if it
reflects a risk of enhanced damages or if it involves technology not at
issue in the later suit.90
Applying these factors to the evidence offered in Sprint, the Federal
Circuit found that the district court had an adequate basis for admitting
the AT&T Agreement into evidence.91 Although the agreement covered
patents in addition to the patents in suit, Prism had provided evidence
and expert testimony to allow the jury to compare the amounts in the
prior settlement to the value of the patents-in-suit.92 Furthermore, the
timing of the AT&T Agreement suggested that “the record was fully de-
veloped and thoroughly tested” and the risk of an inflated settlement
value due to litigation-cost avoidance was diminished.93
2. The Federal Circuit Reviews the Post-AIA On-Sale Bar—Helsinn
Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
Under the pre- and post-Leahy-Smith American Invents Act (AIA)
versions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 and the Supreme Court’s precedent in Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics, Inc., a patent may be found invalid if, before its critical
date, the invention is (1) the subject of a commercial sale or offer for sale;
and (2) ready for patenting.94 Although post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
and pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) both use the phrase “on-sale” to de-
scribe this bar to patentability, the addition of the phrase “or otherwise
available to the public” to § 102(a)(1) has raised speculation that the on-
sale bar for post-AIA patents can only be triggered when an invalidating




89. Id. (internal citations omitted).
90. Id. at 1369–70.
91. Id. at 1371.
92. Id. at 1370–71.
93. Id. at 1371.
94. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998); see Leahy-Smith American In-
vents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011).
95. See, e.g., Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
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cuit’s decision in Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharmaceuticals rejects this
proposition and holds that the sale of a patented invention may suffice to
invalidate the associated patent(s) under the post-AIA on-sale bar, even
when the terms of the sale do not include details of the patented
invention.96
In April 2001, Helsinn and MGI Pharma, Inc. (MGI) entered into li-
censing and supply and purchase agreements for the distribution and sale
of 0.25 and 0.75 doses of palonosetron.97 Although the FDA trials were
ongoing and Helsinn had not yet sought patent protection, the parties
publically announced the terms of the sale in a joint press release and
Securities and Exchange Commission filing.98 Almost two years later, af-
ter successful completion of all FDA testing, Helsinn filed a provisional
patent application. The PTO eventually granted Helsinn four patents
(CINV Patents) directed to treating chemotherapy-induced nausea and
vomiting (CINV) with a 0.25 mg dose of palonosetron.99 While all four
patents share a critical date of January 30, 2002, based on the filing date
of Helsinn’s provisional application to which they claim priority, only
U.S. Patent No. 8,598,219 (’219 Patent) is governed by the post-AIA on-
sale bar.100
In 2011, Helsinn sued Teva for infringement of its CINV Patents, and
Teva defended on the ground that the patents were invalid under the
§ 102 on-sale bar.101 The U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey upheld the validity of the CINV Patents, finding that the invention
was not ready for patenting prior to the critical date.102 Teva appealed.103
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding “there was a
sale of the invention” under pre-AIA § 102(b).104 In doing so, the Federal
Circuit dismissed Helsinn’s argument that their transactions with MGI
did not invalidate the CINV Patents because the 2001 licensing and sup-
ply agreements were conditioned on FDA approval, which was not re-
ceived before the critical date.105 According to the Federal Circuit, “while
the absence of FDA approval may be a relevant consideration,” the fact
that a transaction is subject to regulatory approval would not “prevent it
from being a sale for purpose of the on-sale bar.”106 The Federal Circuit
also distinguished the Helsinn-MGI transaction from situations where the
allegedly invalidating future sale is for a product “when and if it” was
developed or includes no price or quantity term, and from situations
where a company relies on “the confidential services of a contract
96. Id. at 1371.
97. Id. at 1361.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1362.




104. Id. at 1364.
105. Id. at 1365–67.
106. Id. at 1366.
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manufacturer.”107
Next the Federal Circuit considered whether the “AIA changed the
meaning of the on-sale bar under [ ] § 102 so that there was no [future]
sale as to the ’219 Patent.”108 Helsinn and other amici argued that floor
statements made by individual members of Congress and the addition of
the phrase “otherwise available to the public” to post-AIA § 102(a)(1)
suggest that the on-sale bar no longer encompasses secret sales and in-
stead “requires that a sale make the invention available to the public in
order to trigger” the post-AIA on-sale bar.109 The Federal Circuit deter-
mined however, that the floor statements referred to “public use” cases
where “the invention was not, as a result of the use, disclosed to the pub-
lic” and not relevant to the facts of the present case.110 Thus, the prior
cases establishing that the on-sale bar applies even when there is no deliv-
ery, when delivery is set after the critical data, or when the public cannot
ascertain the claimed invention, were not overturned by the AIA amend-
ments. Therefore, as in pre-AIA cases, “if the existence of the sale is
public, the details of the invention need not be publicly disclosed in the
terms of the sale” for the post-AIA on-sale bar apply.111
Finally, the Federal Circuit reiterated that an invention is “ready for
patenting” when the “particular invention [will] work for its intended
purpose,” and that neither the completion of FDA testing nor FDA ap-
proval is required for an invention to be ready for patenting.112 After
reviewing the facts of the present case, the Federal Circuit found “over-
whelming” evidence that the patented invention would work for its in-
tended purpose prior to the critical date and, accordingly, the asserted
claims were invalid under the pre-AIA and post-AIA on-sale bar.113
3. Patent Venue Gets Physical—In re Cray Inc.
The Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland shone a spotlight on
patent venue.114 In In re Cray Inc., the Federal Circuit examined the sec-
ond prong of the patent venue statute to clarify the meaning of the statu-
tory terms “regular and established place of business” in § 1400(b).115
Raytheon sued Cray in the Eastern District of Texas for infringing pat-
ents related to high performance computing systems.116 Cray, a Washing-
ton corporation, moved to transfer the case, arguing that venue was
improper under the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland and
107. Id. at 1366–67 (citing Elan Corp., PLC v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 366 F.3d 1336, 1341
(Fed. Cir 2004); Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en
banc)).
108. Id. at 1367.
109. Id. at 1368.
110. Id. at 1368–69.
111. Id. at 1371.
112. Id. at 1372.
113. Id. at 1373, 1375.
114. See supra Section II.A.2.
115. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
116. Id. at 1359.
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§ 1400(b) because it did not “maintain[ ] a regular and established place
of business within that district.”117 The Eastern District of Texas denied
Cray’s motion and set forth a specific framework for future analysis, but
the Federal Circuit vacated the trial court’s ruling on appeal and estab-
lished a different framework.118
“On the issue of improper venue, the only question before the [Federal
Circuit was] whether Cray has a ‘regular and established place of busi-
ness’ in the Eastern District of Texas within the meaning of § 1400(b).”119
To answer the question, the Federal Circuit began by setting forth “three
general requirements relevant to the inquiry: (1) there must be a physical
place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of busi-
ness; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant” otherwise venue is
improper.120 The Federal Circuit stressed, however, that the requirements
“inform whether there exist the necessary elements” to establish venue
but that the venue analysis “must be closely tied to the language of the
statute.”121
Next, the Federal Circuit refined each of the requirements. First, it de-
termined that “place” implied that “there must still be a physical, geo-
graphical location in the district” and ruled out the possibility of “a
virtual space or [ ] electronic communications from one person to an-
other” establishing venue.122 In addition, the statute requires that the
place must be “regular,” meaning that “sporadic activity cannot create
venue,” and the place must be “established,” not “transient,” and have
“sufficient permanence.”123 Finally, the place must be “a place of the de-
fendant, not solely a place of the defendant’s employee.” The Federal Cir-
cuit explained that the defendant must “establish or ratify the place of
business” in order for that location to establish venue within the dis-
trict.124 Although the Federal Circuit stressed that no fact was controlling,
it listed considerations such as “whether the defendant owns or leases the
place, or exercises other attributes of possession or control over the
place,” and the “defendant’s representations that it has a place of busi-
ness in the district as relevant” to determine whether the place is a place
“of the defendant.”125 The Federal Circuit warned however, “the mere
fact that a defendant has advertised that it has a place of business or has
even set up an office is not sufficient; the defendant must actually engage
in business from that location.”126
After applying the facts of the present case, the Federal Circuit agreed
with Cray that venue in the district was improper since the employee’s
117. Id. at 1357–58; see also supra Section II.A.2.
118. In re Cray, 871 F.3d 1355, 1360.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1362.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1362–63.
124. Id. at 1363.
125. Id. at 1363, 1366.
126. Id. at 1364.
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home, while located in the Eastern District of Texas, did not constitute “a
regular and established place of business” of Cray, and therefore venue
cannot exist in the district under § 1400(b).127
C. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
1. Parallel PTO Proceedings and Federal Court Litigation—Tinnus
Enterprises, LLC v. Telebrands Corp.
Although the Federal Circuit’s decision in Tinnus Enterprises, LLC v.
Telebrands Corp. does not stem directly from an appeal of a PTAB deci-
sion, Tinnus provides an interesting take on the interplay between paral-
lel PTO proceedings and district court litigation.128 In Tinnus, the Federal
Circuit indicated that, at least with respect to the review of a preliminary
injunction, a PTAB decision is not binding on the Federal Circuit.129
Tinnus sued Telebrands for patent infringement and filed a motion for
a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted.130 Telebrands
appealed the preliminary injunction to the Federal Circuit.131 Tinnus’ suit
against Telebrands for patent infringement operated in parallel with
Telebrands’ Post Grant Review petition to invalidate Tinnus’ patent.132
The Federal Circuit noted that the PTAB “rel[ied] on the same evidence
and arguments before the district court” to institute review of all claims
in the patent shortly after the preliminary injunction was granted.133
While the Federal Circuit acknowledged it was aware the PTAB had is-
sued a Final Written Decision finding all claims of Tinnus’ patent indefi-
nite, the Federal Circuit expressed that it was not bound by the PTAB’s
decision, or even persuaded “that the district court abused its discretion
in granting the preliminary injunction.”134 Thus, litigants should be aware
that a decision by an Article I court may not be applicable in a parallel
proceeding before an Article III court until all appeals of the Article I
court’s decision have been exhausted.
2. Don’t Be Shy, Proudly Make Your Claims ‘Bout Money—Secure
Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank National Association
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank Na-
tional Association decreases the pool of patents that may be eligible for
Covered Business Method (CBM) reviews.135 At the initial stage of de-
ciding whether to institute a proceeding, the PTAB decided that Secure
127. Id. at 1364–65.
128. Tinnus Enter., LLC v. Telebrands Corp., 846 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
129. Id. at 1201 n.7.
130. See id. at 1197, 1201.
131. Id. at 1202.
132. Id. at 1201.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 1201 n.7.
135. See Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 848 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
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Axcess’s patent was eligible for CBM review.136 Secure Axcess appealed
the PTAB’s Final Written Decision, challenging the PTAB’s decision to
treat the patent as a CBM patent.137 The Federal Circuit reversed the
PTAB’s decision, finding that the claims of Secure Axcess’s patent relat-
ing to web page authentication for customers of financial institutions
were not eligible for CBM review.138 By statute, a CBM patent is one
“that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or
management of a financial product or service.”139 Interpreting the statute
narrowly, the Federal Circuit held that “[i]t is the claims, in the tradi-
tional patent law sense, properly understood in light of the written
description, that identifies a CBM patent.”140 The Federal Circuit stated
that the written description by itself is not sufficient to determine whether
a patent is eligible for CBM review.141 The Federal Circuit further ex-
pressed that merely being “incidental to” or “complementary to” a finan-
cial activity is not sufficient to establish CBM scope.142 Rather, the claims
must state that they relate to a financial product or service, and must
contain language that explicitly contains a financial activity element.143
3. Mind Your Words—Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.
In another case involving the interplay between parallel PTO proceed-
ings and district court litigation, Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that a patent owner’s statements during an IPR pro-
ceeding can amount to prosecution disclaimer.144 Although this issue was
one of first impression before the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit
noted that the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer had been previously ap-
plied to statements made during other reexamination proceedings.145
After Aylus sued Apple for infringement, Apple filed two separate pe-
titions for IPR with the PTAB.146 The PTAB instituted an IPR based on
the petition challenging all claims of the patent except for claims 2, 4, 21,
and 23.147 Aylus then filed for a voluntary dismissal with prejudice in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California with respect to
all infringement contentions, except those involving claims 2 and 21.148
Apple moved for summary judgment of noninfringement on claims 2 and
136. Id. at 1375.
137. Id. at 1373.
138. See id.
139. Leahy-Smith American Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 § 18(d)(1)
(2011).
140. Secure Axcess, 848 F.3d at 1379.
141. Id. at 1378–79.
142. See id. at 1380 (internal citation omitted).
143. Id.
144. Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
145. Id. at 1359–60.
146. Id. at 1358.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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21.149 In granting summary judgment, the district court construed the
main claim term at issue based on statements that Aylus made when re-
sponding to Apple’s petition for IPR.150 Aylus appealed, arguing that
statements made during an IPR cannot constitute prosecution disclaimer
and that, regardless, its statements did not constitute a “clear and unmis-
takable disclaimer of claim scope.”151
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s claim construction and
grant of summary judgment, holding that: (1) statements made during an
IPR can indeed constitute prosecution disclaimer; and (2) Aylus’ state-
ments did constitute a disclaimer of claim scope.152 The Federal Circuit
emphasized that prosecution disclaimer is a fundamental concept in our
jurisprudence, and that extending this doctrine to IPRs will promote pub-
lic interests and ensure that the “claims are not construed one way in
order to obtain their allowance and in a different way against accused
infringers.”153 Additionally, the Federal Circuit rejected Aylus’ argu-
ments that IPR proceedings are different from other reissue or reexami-
nation proceedings, pointing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuozzo
Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, in which the Supreme Court recognized
IPR proceedings as involving reexamination.154 Thus, parties should con-
sider how statements made during PTAB proceedings may affect litiga-
tion and vice versa.
4. The Court Has a Construction of Its Own—Homeland Housewares,
LLC v. Whirlpool Corporation
In Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., the Federal Circuit
overturned the PTAB’s Final Written Decision and adopted a claim con-
struction not proposed by either party.155 Normally, the Federal Circuit
reviews the PTAB’s “conclusions of law de novo and the [PTAB]’s find-
ings of fact for substantial evidence.”156 Further, where relevant extrinsic
evidence is not present, the Federal Circuit reviews claim construction de
novo.157
In its Final Written Decision for an IPR sought by Homeland, the
PTAB declined to provide a construction for a “predetermined settling
speed” for a blender and further determined that Homeland failed to
show that the prior art anticipated the patent at issue.158 Whirlpool ar-
gued for a construction of predetermined settling speed that requires em-
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1359.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1362.
153. Id. at 1359–60 (citing Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
154. Id. at 1360 (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2134 (2016)).
155. See Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
156. Id. at 1374.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1374–75.
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pirical testing to determine the “settling speed.”159 Homeland argued for
a construction that the settling speed means any speed less than the oper-
ating speed, because not all speeds lower than the operating speed would
cause settling.160 The Federal Circuit rejected both parties’ claim con-
struction and opted instead to give the words of the claim their “ordinary
and customary meaning” and to “adopt a definition . . . that best fits with
the claim language and specification.”161 Settling on the broadest reason-
able construction, the Federal Circuit construed a predetermined settling
speed as “a speed that is slower than the operating speed and permits
settling of the blender contents.”162 Thus, Homeland illustrates that, in
certain cases, the court may construe claims de novo and adopt a con-
struction not proposed by either party.
5. The Cogitations of Five Opinions—Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal
In a 7–4 en banc decision, the Federal Circuit overruled several recent
Federal Circuit decisions, and held that the PTO cannot place the burden
of persuasion regarding the patentabiltiy of claims amended during an
IPR proceeding on the patent owner.163 The Federal Circuit published
five opinions, with Judge O’Malley authoring the main plurality opinion
in which four judges joined and two judges concurred in the result. Four
judges, including Chief Judge Prost, dissented in the judgment. The con-
clusion of the main opinion by Judge O’Malley provides possibly the most
interesting insight into the different judges’ thoughts:
This process has not been easy. We are proceeding without a full
court, and those judges who are participating disagree over a host of
issues. As frustrating as it is for all who put so much thought and
effort into this matter, very little said over the course of the many
pages that form the five opinions in this case has precedential
weight. . . . All the rest of our cogitations, whatever label we have
placed on them, are just that—cogitations. Even our discussions on
whether the statute is ambiguous are mere academic exercises.164
During an IPR initiated by Zodiac, Aqua moved to provide substitute
claims that complied with 35 U.S.C. § 316(d), and argued that the substi-
tute claims were patentable over the obviousness combinations presented




163. Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (overruling
Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Prolitec, Inc. v.
ScentAir Techs., Inc., 807 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2015), petition for reh’g pending; Synopsys,
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 812
F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (“During an inter partes review
instituted under this chapter, the patent owner may file 1 motion to amend the patent
. . . .”); c.f. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (“In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the
petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.”).
164. Aqua, 872 F.3d at 1327–28.
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during the IPR.165 Finding that Aqua had not proved the patentability of
the substitute claims, the PTAB denied the motion.166 After losing its
Federal Circuit appeal in a panel decision, Aqua sought an en banc re-
hearing. The Federal Circuit granted the rehearing with two questions
proposed, only one of which was answered by the court’s decision—who
has the burden of persuasion with respect to the patentability of claims
amended under § 316(d)?167
The Federal Circuit arrived at two legal conclusions:
(1) the PTO has not adopted a rule placing the burden of persuasion
with respect to the patentability of amended claims on the patent
owner that is entitled to deference; and (2) in the absence of any-
thing that might be entitled deference, the PTO may not place that
burden on the patentee.168
The Federal Circuit stated that it thought Congress clearly meant to
place the burden on the petitioner rather than the patent owner, even
though § 316(e) does not specifically identify amended claims.169 Judge
O’Malley noted, however, that the Federal Circuit had to consider
whether the PTO’s interpretation of the statute was entitled Chevron def-
erence because six of the eleven judges believed the statute to be ambigu-
ous.170 Judge O’Malley also noted that the Federal Circuit has previously
explained that Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation of a stat-
ute is required only when the interpretation is permissible.171 Although
the PTO contended that its regulations addressed and interpreted the
scope of both § 316(d) and § 316(e), the Federal Circuit rejected these
contentions, and noted that neither the PTO’s regulations nor the corre-
sponding commentary included any reference to the statutory section in
question, any reference to proving patentability or unpatentability, or any
reference to a “burden of persuasion.”172 Thus, the Federal Circuit deter-
mined that the PTO did not have any interpretation of the statute that
even might be entitled deference.173
III. TRADEMARK UPDATE
A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH WINS OUT—Matal v. Tam
In another highly anticipated case, Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court
considered whether the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act is
facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech
165. Id. at 1297.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1297–98.
168. Id. at 1327.
169. Id. at 1315.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1316 (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 267 (2005)); see also
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
172. Aqua, 872 F.3d at 1318.
173. See id.
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Clause.174 The Supreme Court unanimously held that the disparagement
clause violates the First Amendment.175 Justice Alito delivered the judg-
ment and majority opinion, which includes multiple parts.176
The word “slants” is a derogatory term referring to people of Asian
descent.177 A rock band comprised of Asian-American members took the
name “The Slants” with the goal of reclaiming the word and weakening
its power.178 The band applied for federal registration of “THE
SLANTS,” but the PTO denied the band’s application under the dispar-
agement clause.179 Tam, the lead singer of the band, appealed the PTO’s
decision to the Federal Circuit, where an en banc court found the dispar-
agement clause facially unconstitutional by a majority.180
Affirming the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the disparagement clause “offends a bedrock First Amend-
ment principle: [s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it
expresses ideas that offend.”181 The government argued that trademarks
are not private speech but rather government speech that does not fall
under regulation by the Free Speech Clause.182 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, definitively declared that trademarks are not government speech,
but rather private speech.183 The Supreme Court did recognize the im-
portance of the government-speech doctrine, noting that the “Free
Speech Clause does not require government to maintain viewpoint neu-
trality” because to do so would be paralyzing.184 The Supreme Court,
however, cautioned about the dangers of misusing the doctrine and ex-
tending the doctrine to speech that is actually private in an effort to quiet
unfavorable viewpoints.185 Likening the content of trademarks to the ex-
pressive content of copyrights, the Supreme Court also expressed con-
cerns about whether declaring that federal trademark registration
constitutes government speech would also lead to copyright registration
amounting to government speech.186
174. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017); see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (prohibiting
trademarks that “disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute”); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
175. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
176. Id. at 1750 (Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan
joining in parts I, II, and III-A; Justice Thomas joining except part II; Justices Roberts,
Thomas, and Breyer joining parts III-B, III-C, and IV; Justice Gorsuch taking no part in
the consideration or decision).
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1751.
180. Id. at 1754.
181. Id. at 1751.
182. See id. at 1757.
183. Id. at 1760.
184. Id. at 1757.
185. See id. at 1758.
186. Id. at 1760; see also id. (citing In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en
banc), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016)).
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B. DOES “GOOGLE” EVEN MEAN “GOOGLE” ANYMORE?—
Elliott v. Google, Inc.
In Elliott v. Google, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed the issue of genericide and the “primary significance” test
used to determine when a trademark becomes generic.187 A trademark
falls to genericide when “the public appropriates [the] trademark and
uses it as a generic name for particular types of goods or services irrespec-
tive of its source.”188 The “fateful step” that signifies genericide is when
“the ‘primary significance of the [trademark] to the [ ] public’ is as the
name for a particular type of good or service irrespective of its source.”189
Chris Gillespie acquired 763 domain names involving the word
“google” using a domain name registrar.190 After Google objected to
these registrations, Gillespie and David Elliott petitioned for cancellation
of the GOOGLE trademark under the genericide provision of the Lan-
ham Act, claiming that the word “google” had the generic meaning of
internet searching.191 On cross-motions for summary judgment by both
parties, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona decided in
favor of Google, holding that using a word as a verb does not automati-
cally render that word generic.192 The district court granted Google’s mo-
tion for summary judgment, and Elliott appealed.193
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not find sufficient evidence to support
that “GOOGLE” had become generic with respect to a particular type of
good or service.194 Although Elliott argued that consumer surveys indi-
cated that consumers use the word “google” as a verb, the Ninth Circuit
determined that verb use of a mark does not automatically mean that the
mark has become generic.195 Elliott also argued that Google had used its
own mark generically, but the Ninth Circuit found no evidence to support
this argument.196 Lastly, Elliott argued that there is no alternate word for
“google” that means to search the internet, but the Ninth Circuit re-
peated that a claim of genericide “must relate to a particular type of good
or service.”197 The Ninth Circuit noted that Elliott would have had to
show that there is no alternative word to describe “internet search en-
gines.”198 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment, stating that the case could not survive based on irrelevant
187. Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 362
(2017); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (allowing cancellation of a trademark that has become
generic for a particular type of good or service).
188. Elliott, 860 F.3d. at 1156.
189. Id. (citing § 1064(3)).
190. Id. at 1154.
191. Id. at 1154–55.
192. Id. at 1155.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 1159.
195. Id. at 1160.
196. See id. at 1162.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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evidence simply in “sheer quantity.”199
C. DON’T MESS WITH A GIRL’S BEST FRIEND!—Tiffany & Co. v.
Costco Wholesale Corp.
In Tiffany & Co. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York reviewed damages awarded to Tiffany
in an action against Costco for trademark infringement, trademark coun-
terfeiting, and unfair competition.200 After the district court granted sum-
mary judgment to Tiffany, a jury in the Southern District of New York
awarded $3.7 million in profits and $8.25 million in punitive damages to
Tiffany for Costco’s use of the Tiffany trademark.201 The district court
upheld the jury awards for profits and punitive damages.202 Costco had
used signage in its stores for diamond rings that had the word “Tiffany”
on one line without any modifier (e.g. “setting” or “style”) on the same
line.203 In reviewing the jury’s verdict on damages, the district court
looked at Costco’s valuations of prices for the diamond rings that were
identical to the prices that Tiffany had charged for similar rings.204 The
district court also considered Costco’s “cavalier attitude” in responding to
inquiries and complaints by consumers who found out that the rings were
not manufactured by Tiffany.205 In addition to upholding the jury’s award
for profits, the district court also determined that the trebling of damages
under New York law was not excessive, given that “Costco is a company
with billions of dollars in annual revenue.”206
D. WHAT A COLORFUL WORLD—Deere & Co. v. FIMCO Inc. and In
re General Mills IP Holdings II, LLC
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), in In re General Mills
IP Holdings II, LLC, affirmed a decision by the PTO to not register a
mark consisting of a yellow box.207 The TTAB recognized that a single
color applied to a product or a packaging of the product could be a trade-
mark.208 The TTAB explained, however, that General Mills did not pro-
vide sufficient evidence to show that a yellow box on its own indicates the
Cheerios brand to the public.209 The TTAB further noted that many
other cereal brands use yellow boxes as part of their packaging.210
199. Id.
200. Tiffany & Co. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d 216, 220 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
14, 2017).
201. Id. at 219.
202. Id. at 220.
203. Id. at 219.
204. Id. at 221.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 226.
207. In re General Mills IP Holdings II, LLC, 124 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016, *12 (T.T.A.B.
2017).
208. Id. at *1.
209. Id. at *7.
210. Id.
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In Deere & Co. v. FIMCO Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky found in favor of Deere, determining that FIMCO
had infringed and diluted Deere’s green and yellow trademark.211 The
district court explained that the Deere mark is a “famous trademark in
green and yellow as it is used on John Deere agricultural tractors.”212 The
district court concluded that “FIMCO’s use of green and yellow on
trailed agricultural sprayers and liquid applicators [was] likely to cause
confusion.”213
E. CASE TO WATCH FOR IN 2018: A WHISKEY-“ZERO” IF YOU
PLEASE—Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.
The Federal Circuit will review a ruling by the TTAB214 deciding that
“zero” is a valid trademark for the Coca-Cola Company.215 The Federal
Circuit is faced with the question of whether a term that seems generic,
such as “zero,” can hold a secondary meaning when the term is directly
attached to a specific brand in the context of a species of an identified
genus of beverages.216
IV. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
A. CHEVRONS AND STRIPES FOREVER—Star Athletica, L.L.C. v.
Varsity Brands, Inc.
In Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that features incorporated into the design of a useful article are eligi-
ble for copyright protection if they can be perceived as a work of art
separate from the useful article, and would qualify as a protectable work
if imagined separately from that article.217 The majority opinion also clar-
ified that the separability inquiry should focus on the usefulness of the
extracted feature, not the item left behind; accordingly, “[t]he debate
over the relative utility of a plain white cheerleading uniform is unneces-
sary” to the disposition of the case.218
Varsity Brands sued Star Athletica, charging Star with copyright in-
fringement for marketing cheerleading uniforms similar to their copy-
righted designs.219 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee entered summary judgment in favor of Star, finding that Var-
sity’s copyrights were invalid because cheerleading uniforms are
noncopyrightable useful articles, and the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
211. Deere & Co. v. FIMCO Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 837, 904–05 (W.D. Ky. 2017), super-
seded in part, 301 F. Supp. 3d 704 (W.D. Ky. 2018).
212. Id. at 895.
213. Id. at 897.
214. Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 2016 WL 9227936 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
215. Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 16-2375 (Fed. Cir. filed July 22, 2016).
216. See Brief of Appellee the Coca-Cola Co. at 3, Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
No. 16-2375 (Fed. Cir. filed July 22, 2016), 2017 WL 464562 at *3.
217. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
218. Id. at 1013–14.
219. Id. at 1007.
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elements of Varsity’s designs—the stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color
blocks—were not physically or conceptually separable from the
uniforms.220 The Sixth Circuit sided with Varsity, finding that the graphic
features of the designs are more like fabric designs than dress designs and
are thus are protectable subject matter under the Copyright Act.221
Rather than resolving the circuit split by choosing one of the nine sepa-
rability tests noted in the Sixth Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court set
forth its own two-step test, relying on its opinion in Mazer v. Stein.222 The
majority opinion, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, determined that
a design could be copyrighted if (1) it can be perceived as a 2- or 3-dimen-
sional work that is pictorial, graphic, or sculptural once it is separate from
the useful article; and (2) the design meets the other requirements for
copyright, including originality.223
B. DEFINING A SELLER IN AN INCREASING ONLINE MARKETPLACE—
Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.
In Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that Amazon’s activities, which included providing an online marketplace
and shipping services to third-party vendors selling pillowcases that alleg-
edly infringed the plaintiff’s copyrighted products did not create seller
liability for the purposes of the Copyright Act.224 The Federal Circuit also
recognized that there were “clear parallels between the legal standards”
for what constitutes “a sale” in the patent and copyright contexts, and
that the presence or absence of passage of title is a strong indicator of
whether a sale had occurred in both contexts.225 Although Milo & Gabby
argued that Amazon was liable under several different theories, the Fed-
eral Circuit noted that the third-party sellers retained title to the infring-
ing pillowcases at all times. Because Amazon merely provided an online
marketplace, followed by logistical and shipping services, Amazon was
not a seller for the purposes of copyright infringement.226
V. CONCLUSION
The developments in IP law during the Survey period continue to clar-
ify the scope of intellectual property rights and provide guidance for par-
ties in various industries. For example, the Supreme Court definitively
declared that the equitable defense of laches is unavailable against dam-
ages for infringement that occurred within the allowed period of § 286.
Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland, and the Federal
220. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC., No. 2:2010cv02508, 2014 WL 819422,
at *8–9 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014).
221. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC., 799 F.3d 468, 493 (6th Cir. 2015).
222. See Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1010–12 (internal citations omitted).
223. Id. at 1016.
224. Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 693 F. App’x 879, 866–87 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
225. Id. at 885–86 (internal citations omitted).
226. Id. at 890.
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Circuit’s holding in In re Cray, provide guidance on proper venue for
patent infringement actions. The Supreme Court’s decision in Matal v.
Tam illustrates that the Court will not hesitate to declare laws that offend
the principles of the First Amendment unconstitutional. In summary, the
Survey period reflects changes in the law that provide guidance for par-
ties and practitioners alike. Looking forward, 2018 is already shaping up
to be an interesting year in which several key issues may be decided.
